作為世界上最大的開發中國家和已開發國家，中國和美國的關係一直是西媒關注的焦點，有美媒在9日就討論了中美能否和諧相處的問題，並提及柯林頓曾批評江澤民站在歷史錯誤的一邊。
對於那些長期以來關注中國的人士來說，過去兩年非常令人不安。儘管習近平和歐巴馬舉行了多次會晤，兩國關係處在1989年以來關係的最高點。除了台灣、西藏、人權、智慧財產權等老問題外，新的問題也在產生。中國國內加大了對媒體等的控制;在中國外，中國在南海和東海上的主權聲張因引發爭議。
根據皮尤調查，只有38%的美國人對中國表示肯定，比四年前低了13%。根據在中國的美國商會最新民調顯示，60%的調查人員認為，外國商業相比於過去受歡迎程度低了不少。
兩個有著不同歷史、制度、價值觀的國家可以合作則源於兩次峰會：一次是1972年，美國前總統尼克森訪問中國大陸;另一次是1979年，鄧小平訪美與卡特會晤。但是，1989年的天安門風波又破壞了兩國的進展。但是，在接下來的這幾十年裡，兩國關係取得進步，雙方都認為，通過更多的時間和經濟自由、教育和人文交流，中國會漸漸成為一個更加開放的社會，也會成為一個更加負責任的大國。
柯林頓曾批評江澤民「站在歷史錯誤的一邊(on the wrong side of history)」。對於習近平來說，歷史現在站在了中國一邊，因為中國重回到一個符合它古老文明的中心角色上來。
那麼，美國應該如何應對這一挑戰?首先就是，儘管美國歡迎中國崛起，但是，美國不會無理由地迎合中國。同時，需要表明的一點就是，美國更希望中美前方是一條合作的道路。為了給習近平訪美搭台子，歐巴馬應當向中國派出一名特使，然後要求習近平做出同登回應。然後，歐巴馬應當在白宮內部建立一個由專家組成的中國智庫，來檢驗政府對中國的基本政策。最後，參議院外交關係委員會應當舉行特別的兩黨公聽會，來選取更大範圍的美國專家的意見。
為了取得任何突破，兩國需要準備做出不同的妥協。美國要考慮下列問題：在處理與中國的關係時，要將氣候變化和民主、人權問題同時看作要務;承認中國在南海上有一定範圍內的影響力;對美國軍機靠近南海採取一些新的限制;如果韓國和朝鮮統一，美國不會再朝鮮駐兵或者是安置核武器;給中國在國際貨幣基金會更大的權力。
而中國應該考慮以下問題：同意對海洋爭議按照國際法來裁定;同意通過一種更有效的方式來制裁朝鮮等。
因為這些問題非常棘手，取得突破還需要假以時日。但是，還有另外的選擇嗎?讓中國走上普京的道路嗎，現在，美歐重啟雙邊關係已經無望了。如果讓中美關係也走入一種軍事僵局將會非常可惜。可能，對於中美有積極樂觀的情緒是有道理的，但是，唯一可能的結果就是遏制，甚至對抗。通過對中國60年的研究，在於外界打交道的時候，中國是一個違反常理、不可預測的玩家。
如果還有一條美國能夠和平適應中國崛起的道路，這就會有一系列的妥協和反抗。正值中國股市困擾中共，是時候大膽、努力重塑兩個國家交流的方式了。
以下為原文：
Can the U.S. and China Get Along?
FOR longtime observers of China, the last two years have been unsettling. Under Xi Jinping the Chinese Communist Party has made it more difficult than ever to hope that the People’s Republic is still dedicated to the agenda of「reform and opening up」 that was the mantra of the Deng Xiaoping era. Instead, Beijing has served up a neo-Maoist cocktail of autocracy within and truculence without.
Despite meetings between Presidents Xi and Obama, and a yearly Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the level of discouragement and pessimism, especially among China specialists, about the future of Chinese-American relations is at its highest since the bloodshed of1989.
To the litany of the old problems— Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, intellectual property, currency policy— a host of new ones have been added. In China, advocates for civil and political rights have been arrested; civil society groups harassed; controls on free expression in academia, the media and civil society tightened; and「universal values」 attacked. Outside China, Beijing’s new assertiveness has inflamed disputes in the East and South China Seas even as new controversies have multiplied over hacking and other cyberattacks, harassment of political and social activists, blockage of news media websites, and punitive denials of visa applications for American journalists, writers and scholars who want to work in China.
The Pew Research Center finds that only38 percent of Americans view China favorably, down from51 percent four years earlier. In a recent poll by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, a champion of closer relations,60 percent of respondents said that foreign businesses were less welcome than they used to be, up from41 percent a year earlier.
The idea that countries with such different political histories, systems and values could ever cooperate arose out of two summit meetings: in1972, President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, visited Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai(with both countries alarmed about the Soviet Union) and in1979, Deng Xiaoping visited President Jimmy Carter(when both countries resumed full diplomatic relations). Sadly, these breakthroughs were followed by a breakdown, the suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and cities across China, in1989. Nonetheless, over the ensuing decades the relationship improved enough to allow many on both sides to imagine that, with more time, economic liberalization, and educational and social exchange, China might evolve into a more open society and a more responsible「stakeholder」 in global affairs, giving us a common goal.
It is this inchoate hope that has now been arrested by Mr. Xi’s「Chinese Dream,」 an indigenous reverie confected to rally his people not to the promise of greater openness and constitutionalism, but greater wealth, power, national unity and global clout.
President Bill Clinton once scolded President Jiang Zemin for being「on the wrong side of history.」 As far as Mr. Xi is concerned, history is now on China’s side, as it returns to a central role befitting its ancient civilization and its status as the most populous country.
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How should America respond to this new challenge?
We should reaffirm in the most public way possible that while we welcome China’s「rise,」 we will not accommodate unreasonable claims around the world and, if necessary, are even prepared for a latter-day strategy of「containment,」 which Western democracies used to circumscribe the Communist bloc during the Cold War. However, at the same time, we must make it indelibly clear that we far prefer a collaborative path forward. Such a path needs a road map, and a personal presidential commitment.
To send such a signal, and to set the stage for their meeting in September, Mr. Obama should appoint a special envoy to China, and ask Mr. Xi to reciprocate.(The meetings between Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. and Vice Premier Wang Qishan, during President George W. Bush’s administration, are a model.)
Second, Mr. Obama should create a China think tank within the White House, composed of experts, to examine our government’s basic strategy toward China.
Third, to edify public discussion during an election season, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should hold special bipartisan hearings, as Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, held in the1960s on the conduct of the Vietnam War, to elicit views from an even broader range of American experts.
The threat of climate change presents both countries with, paradoxically, a fortuitous area of common interest that could catalyze the「new kind of major-power relationship」 that Mr. Xi has called for. Last fall’s joint agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a potential game-changer.
But to achieve any kind of lasting breakthrough in the China-United States relationship, both sides must be prepared to make difficult concessions.
The United States should contemplate such previously unthinkable options as:
• Giving climate change at least as high a priority as democracy and human rights in the management of our relationship with China;
• Acknowledging that China is entitled to some kind of「sphere of influence」 in the South China Sea, just as the United States has in the Caribbean, without completely yielding to all of its territorial claims;
• Imposing new limits on flyovers by American military intelligence aircraft near China’s coastal waters;
• Openness to discussing terms for the end of arms sales to Taiwan;
• Guaranteeing that, if Korea unifies, the United States will place neither troops nor nuclear weapons in the North;
• Exploring new ways of giving China a greater governing role in the International Monetary Fund and other institutions of global governance;
• Investigating how the United States could actively support Mr. Xi’s new economic reforms to spur domestic consumption, as the success of those policies is also in our national interest.
The Chinese side might contemplate such options as:
• Agreeing to allow maritime disputes to be adjudicated by international law;
• Consenting to support sanctions against the North Korean regime in a more effective way;
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• Discussing terms for a disavowal of the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait;
• Allowing Hong Kong more autonomy to work out its timetable for attaining universal suffrage.
Because these issues are so intractable, a breakthrough is a long shot. But what’s the alternative? Allow China to follow the path of Vladimir V. Putin’s Russia— which is now well beyond any hope of「reset」? It would be a great pity to let the Chinese-American relationship— of far more importance than the Russian-American relationship— reach a similar state of military impasse without a herculean effort to arrest the slide.
Perhaps the growing pessimism is justified, and the only possible outcome is containment, even confrontation. Am I optimistic? Not really. In China, there is too much paranoia— and talk about covert「hostile foreign forces」 as the cause of China’s problems— to instill confidence. But if I have learned anything in my more than six decades of studying China, it is that when it comes to interacting with the outside world, China can be a counterintuitive and unpredictable player. I have learned to remain open to surprise.
If there is still a peaceful way for the United States to accommodate China’s rise, it will involve a judicious mix of resistance and compromise. Perhaps now, with China’s plummeting stock markets rattling the party’s nerves, is the moment for a bold, concerted effort to recast the way our two essential nations interact.
