包道格（Douglas H. Paal）
三種關係決定中國難以稱霸 -- Will China Rule the World?
包道格（Douglas H. Paal）
《卡內基中國透視》
中國超過日本成為第二大經濟體之後，「中國註定接替美國第一大經濟體地位？」、「中國何時和如何超越美國成為第一大經濟體？」以及「中美是否會因此發生衝突？」等問題的討論和評論開始充斥各大國際媒體。
對此，卡內基國際和平基金會（Carnegie Endowment for International Peace）副總裁包道格（Douglas H. Paal）9月2日發表題為「中國能否統治世界（Will China Rule the World?） 」的文章稱，對於中國能否稱霸世界這一熱點話題，我只要提出三點有關中國的關切，就可能使得那些害怕中國稱霸的人獲得些許安慰，即中國統治者與被統治者之間、中國統治者與國內競爭力量之間以及國有資本主義和市場資本主義之間的關係。
包道格稱，這三大關係很少引起大眾注意，而且媒體關注度不及中國人權問題、非民主措施和放縱的警察行政行為等熱點。因為，考慮它們似乎有點不合常規，但是，對於一些不可預知的事情，可以進行不合常規地思考，因為，有的時候你會意識到，合乎常規地進行思考不但費腦，而且還有可能是失敗和錯誤的。
統治者與被統治者之間的不和
在過去幾年，外國許多政策專家見證了中共中央領導階層和中國各種利益團體之間的進行的「激烈對話」，其中中共領導階層掌管中國整體廣泛利益。而且，得益於中國內部言論自由的不斷進步和新傳媒的不斷壯大，中國退休軍官、各界學者、政策專家和網民開始向中共黨政官員發出質疑和挑戰，要求中國在應對美國、日本、國際市場等方面採取更加嚴厲的立場。
作為回應，中國政府各發言人表態也是逾趨強硬，尤其在美國對台軍售、歐巴馬會見達賴、美軍黃海演習以及美韓在中國南海的聯合軍演等形勢下。發言人表態強硬他們往往是面臨國內評論人士的壓力，但這種壓力很少來自政治體制方面。
不過，在中國實際外交關係事務中，中國官員表現並不是以「強硬措詞」公開對抗美國及其他國家的利益。中國政府官員在外交場所中，往往展現得「明智謹慎」，國內公眾場合面對評論家們則展現出一副「嚴肅面容」。
這種「強硬」而又「謹慎」的行政作風或許會逐漸失去重要性。隨著中國官員在不同代表大會期間的更易，公眾意見逐漸引導中國領導階層的決策。這樣的話，官員們在實現國家利益過程中只靠「謹慎」是不行，這樣難以得到升遷，而是要表現得堅定和富有幹勁，否則他們難以滿足在中國快速現代化進程中民眾對他們的期望。
中共內部政治精英之間「不和諧」
隨著2012年中國共產黨的臨近，中國共產黨內部「權力爭奪」將逾趨激烈。據美國布魯金斯學會中國研究中心資深研究員李成（Cheng Li）今年5月份發布在《中國領導箴言季刊》的文章稱，預計在2012年秋季舉行的中國共產黨第十八次全國代表大會，中國將選舉出新一屆政治局及其常委會。屆時，將有超過70%的中國共產黨高層職位必須「換新」。這種規模的權力交接所帶來的壓力是其他任何政治體制無法承受的，且不說中國這一龐大13多億人口當中，官員數量就超過6千萬左右。
更令人擔憂的是，在官員背景及政績考核與升遷方面，中國尚未尋找到一套可信的領導人選舉標準。中國這種問題有些國家也存在，但是，其「少數人統治十多億人」的政治智慧是世界上獨有的，尤其是其領導人在執政決策和表現方面缺少體制制衡。
而且，多種跡象和傳言表明，中共中央總書記胡錦濤與國務院總理溫家寶未來職位繼承人早已「特定」。最近，據中國界內高層人士稱，胡錦濤總書記和軍委主席的接替人選還是一「未知數」，儘管外界推斷中共政治局常委、中共中央黨校校長、國家副主席習近平是這兩個頭銜的假定繼承人。
同樣也有傳言稱，中共內部幾位副總理或「有意」爭相奪取未來經濟大權，從而能夠成為未來國務院總理。現在充斥的討論議題還有：需要尋找像前國務院總理朱鎔基那樣執政「果斷、有力」的經濟領袖，由此釋放出對這幾位副總理合格程度的些許懷疑。
中國國家資本主義和市場資本主義的衝突
「北京共識（Beijing consensus）」這一模式是另外一個備受討論的主題。這一發展模式被稱作是中國通過艱苦努力、主動創新和大膽實踐，摸索出一個適合本國國情的發展模式。它表現的是獨裁主義與國家資本主義的密切配合，在某種程度上被認為可以取代將民主主義和自由市場經濟緊密相連的「華盛頓共識（the Washington consensus）」，而「華盛頓共識」受全球金融危機的影響已經收到質疑。
駁斥「北京共識」有多種方式和多種角度。卡內基國際和平基金會駐北京高級研究員佩蒂斯(Michael Pettis)稱，中國經濟快速增長模式依賴於將普通民眾收入化作補助資金，分配給政府看好的投資者，其中包括國企和有後台的企業家。佩蒂斯認為，這種模式扭曲國際貿易模式，勢將導致針對中國出口的保護主義政策，不利於中國貿易的最惠國待遇地位，中國GDP也將低於現在水平，從而引發中共就目前體制無法處理的社會動盪。
第二種看待「北京共識」模式的方式就是從日本二十世紀八九十年代亞洲「頭號地位」看起。當時，資本的充裕和廉價，使得投資者不顧房地產及其他資產的過高估價大肆進行借入並流通，從而埋下日本經濟衰退的禍根。日本出口並沒有促成日本經濟的崩潰，而是長時期的通貨緊縮使得國內無法啟動經濟補救措施。就中國而言，隨著其現代化發展步伐逐步向西擴展，經濟還有繼續增長的空間，但是，中國經濟成就將主要依賴內需型經濟模式拉動，而這種模式需要將投資收益返回給普通儲款人用於消費，這將抬高資本成本，使得依賴低成本資金髮展的企業難以盈利。也就是說，中國必須改變經商之道，並對其體制運行方式產生重大影響。
以上三種關係如果逐一予以應對或許「可控」，但同時應對三種關係將面臨真正風險
如果在中國民眾呼籲政府採取更為嚴厲的對外政策立場的同時，中國精英們開始進行「權力爭奪」，照以往經驗來看，中國國內民眾關切將勝過對外政策利益。也即是說，中國民眾對外國關切將不予理會。當絕對權力處以險境的時候，如中國和其他有些國家，對外關係細微之處則很快被拋之腦後。
或許最重要的是，中國經濟成功管理方式最終將被調整以適應市場經濟。為了贏得支持，頭腦清醒的中國行政官員們將逐漸受到利益集團政治的影響，這種政治當然不基於市場經濟學。期間，事實扭曲當然不可避免，使得中國民眾無法得到真實的GDP數據，這類問題在統治者和被統治者之間存在不合時將被逐步惡化。
所以，在考慮中國能否成為世界霸主之時，應該側重其「難駕馭」的一面以及其歷史和經濟發展中無法滿足的各種「欲望」。中國將面臨來自領國以及國際體制的各種新挑戰，與此同時，中國經濟還需要進行必要的「瘦身」以達到預期效果。所以，現在不是耗時討論應對崛起中國與現狀強權（美國）之間衝突的時候，而是，國際社會考慮如何合作限制中國崛起帶來的挑戰和傷害。
Will China Rule the World?
Douglas H. Paal
Carnegie Commentary, September 2, 2010
Once in a while it is worth pondering whether the conventional wisdom about China’s meteoric rise is right. Is China destined to move beyond its newly won position as the world’s number two economy to become number one? Will the United States be displaced from its primacy in global security? Is the rising power destined to clash with the current leading power? These are the themes of much recent commentary, including journalist Martin Jacques』 new book, When China Rules the World.
Thinking unconventionally necessarily involves speculating about things that are unknowable today. But doing so might prove a useful exercise before we reach conventional conclusions that are expensive, defeatist, or just plain wrong.
There are three big things going on in China that should be sources of concern—or perhaps relief—for those who fear China’s domination. These do not get much media attention and do not involve the usual reactions to human rights abuses, undemocratic methods, unrestrained police behavior and the like. Instead, it is about the relationships between rulers and the ruled; between the rulers and their internal competitors; and between state and market capitalism.
Discord Between the Rulers and the Ruled
Over the past year, foreign policy experts have witnessed what might be gently termed an intensifying conversation between Chinese interest groups and the central party leadership, which has overall responsibility for looking after China’s broader interests. Taking advantage of new media and increased freedom of expression within China, retired military officers, academics, policy experts and web users (called 「netizens」 in China), have questioned and challenged officers of the Chinese party and government to take tougher positions regarding the United States, Japan, international markets, and other matters.
In response, China’s spokesmen took increasingly tougher rhetorical positions under pressure from their critics inside China—but outside the formal political system. This happened on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, proposed exercises by the aircraft carrier George Washington in the Yellow Sea, and surveillance missions in the South China Sea.
Yet, in the real conduct of foreign relations, China’s official actions have not yet gone beyond rhetoric to openly confronting the interests of the United States and others. Officials have displayed a prudent reserve in the quiet councils of government, while trying to show a tough public exterior to their critics inside China.
Is this sustainable? In the absence of a constructive narrative that will calm the patriotic appetites of the internal Chinese critics, it will probably prove futile. As party congresses come and go and public opinion increasingly guides leadership decisions, how long can Chinese officials who aspire for promotion gain approval for pursuing Chinese interests prudently, rather than robustly and aggressively? How long will they be willing and able to tone down popular rhetoric while delivering less than fulfilling compromises to a citizenry whose expectations have been fired up by China’s rapid modernization?
Discord Within China’s Ruling Communist Party Elite
Over the next two years, leading up to the Eighteenth Party Congress in late 2012, jockeying will intensify as more than 70 percent of China’s top jobs must be turned over to new leaders in accordance with recently introduced rules on retirement and tenure, according to Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution. This scale of turnover would strain any system, let alone one with such a huge denominator of population (1.3 billion) to the numerator of officials (around 60 million).
Adding to our worries is that China has not yet found a dependable set of criteria for selecting leaders in terms of background and performance before promotion. China is far from alone in this problem, but it is singular in its dependency on the wisdom of a few people to govern more than a billion, particularly leaders who lack institutional checks and balances on their judgments and performance.
There are, moreover, increasing signs and rumors that the designated successors to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao may not be up to their jobs. On a recent visit, senior personalities said plainly to foreigners that the next leader after President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao is unknown, despite Vice President Xi Jinping’s status as the presumptive heir.
Similar rumors surround the willingness or ability of several vice premiers to manage the Chinese economy as premier. A frequent conversation topic is the need to find a strong and decisive economic leader, like former premier Zhu Rongji, accompanied by expressions of doubt that the current candidates will measure up.
The Conflict Between State and Market Capitalism
Another current theme of commentary about China extols the 「Beijing consensus」 of authoritarianism married to state capitalism that has prospered when others faltered. It is seen as somehow replacing 「the Washington consensus」 that joins democracy with free market capitalism—now seen as discredited by the global financial crisis.
There are many ways to attack this point of view. One is articulated by my Carnegie colleague Michael Pettis, who says that China’s formula for rapid growth has depended on repressing the income of ordinary Chinese in order to dispense subsidized capital to favored investors, including state-owned enterprises and well-connected entrepreneurs.
Pettis argues that this distorts international trade patterns and will inevitably lead to protectionism against Chinese exports, and will, one way or another, bring China’s favored trade status today to an uncomfortable end. GDP growth will fall well below recent levels, introducing social tensions the Communist Party is ill-equipped to address in its present form. And these tensions may be even harder to address if the conflicts between rulers and ruled and between rulers and their competitors unfold as suggested above.
A second way of looking at the 「Beijing consensus」 is simply to remind ourselves of the hyped rhetoric of the 1980s and early 1990s, when Japan was seen as becoming 「Number One.」 Cheap and abundant capital, borrowed by investors against impossibly high valuations of real estate and other assets, set Japan up for a fall. In this case, it was not a collapse of Japan’s export markets that delivered the blow, but a prolonged deflation that resisted domestic remedy.
China may have room yet to continue growing as the benefits of modernization spread westward within China, but its success will depend on significantly promoting domestic-led growth, which in turn will require returning the proceeds of investment to ordinary depositors, which will raise the cost of capital to enterprises who now depend on low-cost capital to be profitable. In other words, the China we see now will have to change the way it does business—with major implications for how its system works.
Now, one of these problems by itself might be a manageable challenge for foreigners, their governments, and the international system, but the three taken together pose real risks. If China’s elite begins to fight over power as the public clamors for tougher foreign policy positions, experience suggests that domestic Chinese concerns will trump foreign policy interests. Foreign considerations would receive short shrift. When absolute power is at stake, certainly in China and elsewhere, the niceties of foreign relations are quickly forgotten.
Probably more important, China’s so-far successful management of its state economy will ultimately be forced to accommodate the gravity of market economics. In appealing for supporters, the level headed bureaucrats that have substituted for market forces in China’s economic rise in recent years will be increasingly subjected to interest group politics not necessarily grounded in market economics. Distortions will necessarily occur and deny the Chinese the rate of growth to which they are now accustomed. Again, these issues will be exacerbated by discord among the rulers and ruled.
So, instead of Chinese momentum toward world rule, we should be thinking about an unruly China, with unsatisfied historical and economic appetites. It will confront its neighbors and the international system with new challenges at the same time its economy will be reducing the means needed to shape outcomes. Therefore, it is time not to plan for a long-term wasting conflict between a rising power and the status quo power it seeks to replace. Rather, we should nurture international cooperation to limit the damage caused by a thrashing dragon.
包道格（Douglas H. Paal）
《卡內基中國透視》
中國超過日本成為第二大經濟體之後，「中國註定接替美國第一大經濟體地位？」、「中國何時和如何超越美國成為第一大經濟體？」以及「中美是否會因此發生衝突？」等問題的討論和評論開始充斥各大國際媒體。
對此，卡內基國際和平基金會（Carnegie Endowment for International Peace）副總裁包道格（Douglas H. Paal）9月2日發表題為「中國能否統治世界（Will China Rule the World?） 」的文章稱，對於中國能否稱霸世界這一熱點話題，我只要提出三點有關中國的關切，就可能使得那些害怕中國稱霸的人獲得些許安慰，即中國統治者與被統治者之間、中國統治者與國內競爭力量之間以及國有資本主義和市場資本主義之間的關係。
包道格稱，這三大關係很少引起大眾注意，而且媒體關注度不及中國人權問題、非民主措施和放縱的警察行政行為等熱點。因為，考慮它們似乎有點不合常規，但是，對於一些不可預知的事情，可以進行不合常規地思考，因為，有的時候你會意識到，合乎常規地進行思考不但費腦，而且還有可能是失敗和錯誤的。
統治者與被統治者之間的不和
在過去幾年，外國許多政策專家見證了中共中央領導階層和中國各種利益團體之間的進行的「激烈對話」，其中中共領導階層掌管中國整體廣泛利益。而且，得益於中國內部言論自由的不斷進步和新傳媒的不斷壯大，中國退休軍官、各界學者、政策專家和網民開始向中共黨政官員發出質疑和挑戰，要求中國在應對美國、日本、國際市場等方面採取更加嚴厲的立場。
作為回應，中國政府各發言人表態也是逾趨強硬，尤其在美國對台軍售、歐巴馬會見達賴、美軍黃海演習以及美韓在中國南海的聯合軍演等形勢下。發言人表態強硬他們往往是面臨國內評論人士的壓力，但這種壓力很少來自政治體制方面。
不過，在中國實際外交關係事務中，中國官員表現並不是以「強硬措詞」公開對抗美國及其他國家的利益。中國政府官員在外交場所中，往往展現得「明智謹慎」，國內公眾場合面對評論家們則展現出一副「嚴肅面容」。
這種「強硬」而又「謹慎」的行政作風或許會逐漸失去重要性。隨著中國官員在不同代表大會期間的更易，公眾意見逐漸引導中國領導階層的決策。這樣的話，官員們在實現國家利益過程中只靠「謹慎」是不行，這樣難以得到升遷，而是要表現得堅定和富有幹勁，否則他們難以滿足在中國快速現代化進程中民眾對他們的期望。
中共內部政治精英之間「不和諧」
隨著2012年中國共產黨的臨近，中國共產黨內部「權力爭奪」將逾趨激烈。據美國布魯金斯學會中國研究中心資深研究員李成（Cheng Li）今年5月份發布在《中國領導箴言季刊》的文章稱，預計在2012年秋季舉行的中國共產黨第十八次全國代表大會，中國將選舉出新一屆政治局及其常委會。屆時，將有超過70%的中國共產黨高層職位必須「換新」。這種規模的權力交接所帶來的壓力是其他任何政治體制無法承受的，且不說中國這一龐大13多億人口當中，官員數量就超過6千萬左右。
更令人擔憂的是，在官員背景及政績考核與升遷方面，中國尚未尋找到一套可信的領導人選舉標準。中國這種問題有些國家也存在，但是，其「少數人統治十多億人」的政治智慧是世界上獨有的，尤其是其領導人在執政決策和表現方面缺少體制制衡。
而且，多種跡象和傳言表明，中共中央總書記胡錦濤與國務院總理溫家寶未來職位繼承人早已「特定」。最近，據中國界內高層人士稱，胡錦濤總書記和軍委主席的接替人選還是一「未知數」，儘管外界推斷中共政治局常委、中共中央黨校校長、國家副主席習近平是這兩個頭銜的假定繼承人。
同樣也有傳言稱，中共內部幾位副總理或「有意」爭相奪取未來經濟大權，從而能夠成為未來國務院總理。現在充斥的討論議題還有：需要尋找像前國務院總理朱鎔基那樣執政「果斷、有力」的經濟領袖，由此釋放出對這幾位副總理合格程度的些許懷疑。
中國國家資本主義和市場資本主義的衝突
「北京共識（Beijing consensus）」這一模式是另外一個備受討論的主題。這一發展模式被稱作是中國通過艱苦努力、主動創新和大膽實踐，摸索出一個適合本國國情的發展模式。它表現的是獨裁主義與國家資本主義的密切配合，在某種程度上被認為可以取代將民主主義和自由市場經濟緊密相連的「華盛頓共識（the Washington consensus）」，而「華盛頓共識」受全球金融危機的影響已經收到質疑。
駁斥「北京共識」有多種方式和多種角度。卡內基國際和平基金會駐北京高級研究員佩蒂斯(Michael Pettis)稱，中國經濟快速增長模式依賴於將普通民眾收入化作補助資金，分配給政府看好的投資者，其中包括國企和有後台的企業家。佩蒂斯認為，這種模式扭曲國際貿易模式，勢將導致針對中國出口的保護主義政策，不利於中國貿易的最惠國待遇地位，中國GDP也將低於現在水平，從而引發中共就目前體制無法處理的社會動盪。
第二種看待「北京共識」模式的方式就是從日本二十世紀八九十年代亞洲「頭號地位」看起。當時，資本的充裕和廉價，使得投資者不顧房地產及其他資產的過高估價大肆進行借入並流通，從而埋下日本經濟衰退的禍根。日本出口並沒有促成日本經濟的崩潰，而是長時期的通貨緊縮使得國內無法啟動經濟補救措施。就中國而言，隨著其現代化發展步伐逐步向西擴展，經濟還有繼續增長的空間，但是，中國經濟成就將主要依賴內需型經濟模式拉動，而這種模式需要將投資收益返回給普通儲款人用於消費，這將抬高資本成本，使得依賴低成本資金髮展的企業難以盈利。也就是說，中國必須改變經商之道，並對其體制運行方式產生重大影響。
以上三種關係如果逐一予以應對或許「可控」，但同時應對三種關係將面臨真正風險
如果在中國民眾呼籲政府採取更為嚴厲的對外政策立場的同時，中國精英們開始進行「權力爭奪」，照以往經驗來看，中國國內民眾關切將勝過對外政策利益。也即是說，中國民眾對外國關切將不予理會。當絕對權力處以險境的時候，如中國和其他有些國家，對外關係細微之處則很快被拋之腦後。
或許最重要的是，中國經濟成功管理方式最終將被調整以適應市場經濟。為了贏得支持，頭腦清醒的中國行政官員們將逐漸受到利益集團政治的影響，這種政治當然不基於市場經濟學。期間，事實扭曲當然不可避免，使得中國民眾無法得到真實的GDP數據，這類問題在統治者和被統治者之間存在不合時將被逐步惡化。
所以，在考慮中國能否成為世界霸主之時，應該側重其「難駕馭」的一面以及其歷史和經濟發展中無法滿足的各種「欲望」。中國將面臨來自領國以及國際體制的各種新挑戰，與此同時，中國經濟還需要進行必要的「瘦身」以達到預期效果。所以，現在不是耗時討論應對崛起中國與現狀強權（美國）之間衝突的時候，而是，國際社會考慮如何合作限制中國崛起帶來的挑戰和傷害。
Will China Rule the World?
Douglas H. Paal
Carnegie Commentary, September 2, 2010
Once in a while it is worth pondering whether the conventional wisdom about China’s meteoric rise is right. Is China destined to move beyond its newly won position as the world’s number two economy to become number one? Will the United States be displaced from its primacy in global security? Is the rising power destined to clash with the current leading power? These are the themes of much recent commentary, including journalist Martin Jacques』 new book, When China Rules the World.
Thinking unconventionally necessarily involves speculating about things that are unknowable today. But doing so might prove a useful exercise before we reach conventional conclusions that are expensive, defeatist, or just plain wrong.
There are three big things going on in China that should be sources of concern—or perhaps relief—for those who fear China’s domination. These do not get much media attention and do not involve the usual reactions to human rights abuses, undemocratic methods, unrestrained police behavior and the like. Instead, it is about the relationships between rulers and the ruled; between the rulers and their internal competitors; and between state and market capitalism.
Discord Between the Rulers and the Ruled
Over the past year, foreign policy experts have witnessed what might be gently termed an intensifying conversation between Chinese interest groups and the central party leadership, which has overall responsibility for looking after China’s broader interests. Taking advantage of new media and increased freedom of expression within China, retired military officers, academics, policy experts and web users (called 「netizens」 in China), have questioned and challenged officers of the Chinese party and government to take tougher positions regarding the United States, Japan, international markets, and other matters.
In response, China’s spokesmen took increasingly tougher rhetorical positions under pressure from their critics inside China—but outside the formal political system. This happened on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, proposed exercises by the aircraft carrier George Washington in the Yellow Sea, and surveillance missions in the South China Sea.
Yet, in the real conduct of foreign relations, China’s official actions have not yet gone beyond rhetoric to openly confronting the interests of the United States and others. Officials have displayed a prudent reserve in the quiet councils of government, while trying to show a tough public exterior to their critics inside China.
Is this sustainable? In the absence of a constructive narrative that will calm the patriotic appetites of the internal Chinese critics, it will probably prove futile. As party congresses come and go and public opinion increasingly guides leadership decisions, how long can Chinese officials who aspire for promotion gain approval for pursuing Chinese interests prudently, rather than robustly and aggressively? How long will they be willing and able to tone down popular rhetoric while delivering less than fulfilling compromises to a citizenry whose expectations have been fired up by China’s rapid modernization?
Discord Within China’s Ruling Communist Party Elite
Over the next two years, leading up to the Eighteenth Party Congress in late 2012, jockeying will intensify as more than 70 percent of China’s top jobs must be turned over to new leaders in accordance with recently introduced rules on retirement and tenure, according to Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution. This scale of turnover would strain any system, let alone one with such a huge denominator of population (1.3 billion) to the numerator of officials (around 60 million).
Adding to our worries is that China has not yet found a dependable set of criteria for selecting leaders in terms of background and performance before promotion. China is far from alone in this problem, but it is singular in its dependency on the wisdom of a few people to govern more than a billion, particularly leaders who lack institutional checks and balances on their judgments and performance.
There are, moreover, increasing signs and rumors that the designated successors to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao may not be up to their jobs. On a recent visit, senior personalities said plainly to foreigners that the next leader after President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao is unknown, despite Vice President Xi Jinping’s status as the presumptive heir.
Similar rumors surround the willingness or ability of several vice premiers to manage the Chinese economy as premier. A frequent conversation topic is the need to find a strong and decisive economic leader, like former premier Zhu Rongji, accompanied by expressions of doubt that the current candidates will measure up.
The Conflict Between State and Market Capitalism
Another current theme of commentary about China extols the 「Beijing consensus」 of authoritarianism married to state capitalism that has prospered when others faltered. It is seen as somehow replacing 「the Washington consensus」 that joins democracy with free market capitalism—now seen as discredited by the global financial crisis.
There are many ways to attack this point of view. One is articulated by my Carnegie colleague Michael Pettis, who says that China’s formula for rapid growth has depended on repressing the income of ordinary Chinese in order to dispense subsidized capital to favored investors, including state-owned enterprises and well-connected entrepreneurs.
Pettis argues that this distorts international trade patterns and will inevitably lead to protectionism against Chinese exports, and will, one way or another, bring China’s favored trade status today to an uncomfortable end. GDP growth will fall well below recent levels, introducing social tensions the Communist Party is ill-equipped to address in its present form. And these tensions may be even harder to address if the conflicts between rulers and ruled and between rulers and their competitors unfold as suggested above.
A second way of looking at the 「Beijing consensus」 is simply to remind ourselves of the hyped rhetoric of the 1980s and early 1990s, when Japan was seen as becoming 「Number One.」 Cheap and abundant capital, borrowed by investors against impossibly high valuations of real estate and other assets, set Japan up for a fall. In this case, it was not a collapse of Japan’s export markets that delivered the blow, but a prolonged deflation that resisted domestic remedy.
China may have room yet to continue growing as the benefits of modernization spread westward within China, but its success will depend on significantly promoting domestic-led growth, which in turn will require returning the proceeds of investment to ordinary depositors, which will raise the cost of capital to enterprises who now depend on low-cost capital to be profitable. In other words, the China we see now will have to change the way it does business—with major implications for how its system works.
Now, one of these problems by itself might be a manageable challenge for foreigners, their governments, and the international system, but the three taken together pose real risks. If China’s elite begins to fight over power as the public clamors for tougher foreign policy positions, experience suggests that domestic Chinese concerns will trump foreign policy interests. Foreign considerations would receive short shrift. When absolute power is at stake, certainly in China and elsewhere, the niceties of foreign relations are quickly forgotten.
Probably more important, China’s so-far successful management of its state economy will ultimately be forced to accommodate the gravity of market economics. In appealing for supporters, the level headed bureaucrats that have substituted for market forces in China’s economic rise in recent years will be increasingly subjected to interest group politics not necessarily grounded in market economics. Distortions will necessarily occur and deny the Chinese the rate of growth to which they are now accustomed. Again, these issues will be exacerbated by discord among the rulers and ruled.
So, instead of Chinese momentum toward world rule, we should be thinking about an unruly China, with unsatisfied historical and economic appetites. It will confront its neighbors and the international system with new challenges at the same time its economy will be reducing the means needed to shape outcomes. Therefore, it is time not to plan for a long-term wasting conflict between a rising power and the status quo power it seeks to replace. Rather, we should nurture international cooperation to limit the damage caused by a thrashing dragon.